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Abstract
Settings such as lending and policing can be modeled by a centralized agent allocating a scarce
resource (e.g. loans or police officers) amongst several groups, in order to maximize some objective (e.g.
loans given that are repaid, or criminals that are apprehended). Often in such problems fairness is
also a concern. One natural notion of fairness, based on general principles of equality of opportunity ,
asks that conditional on an individual being a candidate for the resource in question, the probability of
actually receiving it is approximately independent of the individual’s group. For example, in lending this
would mean that equally creditworthy individuals in different racial groups have roughly equal chances of
receiving a loan. In policing it would mean that two individuals committing the same crime in different
districts would have roughly equal chances of being arrested.
In this paper, we formalize this general notion of fairness for allocation problems and investigate
its algorithmic consequences. Our main technical results include an efficient learning algorithm that
converges to an optimal fair allocation even when the allocator does not know the frequency of candidates
(i.e. creditworthy individuals or criminals) in each group. This algorithm operates in a censored feedback
model in which only the number of candidates who received the resource in a given allocation can be
observed, rather than the true number of candidates in each group. This models the fact that we do not
learn the creditworthiness of individuals we do not give loans to and do not learn about crimes committed
if the police presence in a district is low.
As an application of our framework and algorithm, we consider the predictive policing problem, in
which the resource being allocated to each group is the number of police officers assigned to each district.
The learning algorithm is trained on arrest data gathered from its own deployments on previous days,
resulting in a potential feedback loop that our algorithm provably overcomes. In this case, the fairness
constraint asks that the probability that an individual who has committed a crime is arrested should be
independent of the district in which they live. We empirically investigate the performance of our learning
algorithm on the Philadelphia Crime Incidents dataset.
1 Introduction
The bulk of the literature on algorithmic fairness has focused on classification and regression problems (see
e.g. [3, 4, 6–8, 10, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20, 25–27] for a collection of recent work), but fairness concerns also arise
naturally in many resource allocation settings. Informally, a resource allocation problem is one in which there
is a limited supply of some resource to be distributed across multiple groups with differing needs. Resource
allocation problems arise in financial applications (e.g. allocating loans), disaster response (allocating aid),
and many other domains — but the primary example that we will focus on in this paper is policing. In
the predictive policing problem, the resource to be distributed is police officers, which can be dispatched to
different districts. Each district has a different crime distribution, and the goal (absent additional fairness
constraints) might be to maximize the number of crimes caught.1
1We understand that policing has many goals besides simply apprehending criminals, including preventing crimes in the
first place, fostering healthy community relations, and generally promoting public safety. But for concreteness and simplicity
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Of course, fairness concerns abound in this setting, and recent work (see e.g. [11, 12, 21]) has highlighted
the extent to which algorithmic allocation might exacerbate those concerns. For example, Lum and Isaac
[21] show that if predictive policing algorithms such as PredPol are trained using past arrest data to predict
future crime, then pernicious feedback loops can arise, which misestimate the true crime rates in certain
districts, leading to an overallocation of police.2 Since the communities that Lum and Isaac [21] showed
to be overpoliced on a relative basis were primarily poor and minority, this is especially concerning from a
fairness perspective. In this work, we study algorithms that both avoid this kind of under-exploration and
can incorporate quantitative fairness constraints.
In the predictive policing setting, Ensign et al. [11] implicitly consider an allocation to be fair if police are
allocated across districts in direct proportion to the district’s crime rate; generally extended, this definition
asks that units of a resource are allocated according to the group’s share of the total candidates for that
resource. In our work, we study a different notion of allocative fairness that has a similar motivation to the
notion of equality of opportunity proposed by Hardt et al. [14] in classification settings. Informally speaking,
it asks that the probability that a candidate for a resource be allocated a resource should be independent of
his group. In the predictive policing setting, it asks that conditional on committing a crime, the probability
that an individual is apprehended should not depend on the district in which they commit the crime.
To illustrate that our notions of fairness do not depend on whether individuals would prefer to receive
or not receive the good, we highlight another setting in which allocative fairness is a natural concern:
hiring.3 Suppose a company wishes to recruit machine learning programmers by advertising on a social
media platform. Many such platforms offer the ability to advertise to different demographics of users and
charge by the number of times the advertisement is shown to different users (i.e., the number of impressions);
a fixed advertising budget can then be viewed as a number of impressions to allocate. Depending on how
well the platform can identify programmers within each demographic, the ad may be shown to a higher or
lower number of programmers. In this setting, our notion of allocative fairness asks that the probability
a programmer is exposed to the hiring ad (and thus, receives the opportunity to apply for a job) does
not depend on the programmer’s demographic, and the allocation problem is to maximize the number of
programmers reached via the choice of impressions across each demographic, subject to fairness constraints.
1.1 Our Results
To define the extent to which an allocation satisfies our fairness constraint, we must model the specific
mechanism by which resources deployed to a particular group reach their intended targets. We study two
such discovery models, and we view the explicit framing of this modeling step as one of the contributions
of our work; the implications of a fairness constraint depend strongly on the details of the discovery model,
and choosing one is an important step in making one’s assumptions transparent.
We study two discovery models which capture two extremes of targeting ability. In the random discovery
model, however many units of the resource are allocated to a given group, all individuals within that group
are equally likely to be assigned a unit, regardless of whether they are a candidate for the resource or not.
In other words, the probability that a candidate receives a resource is equal to the ratio of the number of
units of the resource assigned to his group to the size of his group (independent of the number of candidates
in the group).
At the other extreme, in the precision discovery model, units of the resource are given only to actual
candidates within a group, as long as there is sufficient supply of the resource. In other words, the probability
that a candidate receives a resource is equal to the ratio of the number of units of the resource assigned to
his group, to the number of candidates within his group.
In the policing setting, these models can be viewed as two extremes of police targeting ability for an
intervention like stop-and-frisk. In the random model, police are viewed as stopping people uniformly at
we consider the limited objective of apprehending criminals.
2Predictive policing algorithms are often proprietary, and it is not clear whether in deployed systems, arrest data (rather
than 911 reported crime) is used to train the models.
3Dwork and Ilvento [9] consider such a setting under different fairness notions and with different research questions in mind.
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random. In the precision model, police have the omniscient ability to identify individuals with contraband,
and stop only them. Of course, reality lies somewhere in between.
These different discovery models have different implications for fairness. In the random model, fairness
constrains resources to be distributed in amounts proportional to group sizes, regardless of the distribution
of candidates, and so is uninteresting from a learning perspective. On the other hand, the precision model
yields an interesting fairness-constrained learning problem when the distribution of the number of candidates
in each group must be learned via observation, and what counts as a ‘fair’ allocation depends greatly on
these distributions.
We study learning in a censored feedback setting: each round, the algorithm can choose a feasible
deployment of resources across groups. Then the number of candidates for the current round in each group
is drawn from a fixed, but unknown group-dependent distribution (which might be not be independent from
the distributions in other groups). The algorithm does not observe the number of candidates present in
each group, but only the number of candidates that received the resource. In the policing setting, this
corresponds to the algorithm being able to observe the number of arrests, but not the actual number of
crimes in each of the districts. Thus, the extent to which the algorithm can learn about the distribution in
a particular group is limited by the number of resources it deploys there. The goal of the algorithm is to
converge to an optimal fairness-constrained allocation, where here both the objective value of the solution,
and the constraints imposed on it, depend on the unknown distributions.
One trivial solution to the learning problem is to sequentially deploy all of one’s resources to each group
in turn for a sufficient amount of time to accurately learn the candidate distributions. This would reduce
the learning problem to an offline constrained optimization problem, which we show can be efficiently solved
by a greedy algorithm. But this algorithm is unreasonable: it has a large exploration phase in which it uses
nonsensical deployments, vastly overallocating to some groups and underallocating to others. A much more
realistic, natural approach is a greedy-style learning algorithm, which at each round simply uses its current
best-guess estimate for the distribution in each group and deploys an optimal fairness-constrained allocation
according to these estimates. Unfortunately, as we show, if one makes no assumptions on the underlying
distributions, any algorithm that has a guarantee of converging to a fair allocation must behave like the
trivial algorithm, deploying vast numbers of resources to each group in turn.
This impossibility result motivates us to consider the learning problem in which the unknown distributions
are from a known parametric family. The natural greedy algorithm uses an optimal fair deployment at each
round given the maximum likelihood estimates of candidate distributions given its (censored) observations so
far; for concreteness, we analyze this algorithm in case of the Poisson distribution, and show that it converges
to an optimal fair allocation, but our analysis generalizes for any single-parameter Lipschitz-continuous family
of distributions.
Finally, we conduct an empirical evaluation of our algorithm on the Philadelphia Crime Incidents dataset,
which records all crimes reported to the Philadelphia Police Department’s INCT system between 2006 and
2016. We verify that the crime distributions in each district are in fact well-approximated by Poisson
distributions, and that our algorithm converges quickly to an optimal fair allocation (as measured according
to the empirical crime distributions in the dataset). We also systematically evaluate the Price of Fairness,
and plot the Pareto curves that trade off the number of crimes caught versus the slack allowed in our fairness
constraint, for different sizes of police force, on this dataset. For the random discovery model, we prove
worst-case bounds on the Price of Fairness.
1.2 Further Related Work
Our precision discovery model is inspired by and has technical connections to Ganchev et al. [13], which
models the dark pool problem from quantitative finance, in which a trader wishes to execute a specified
number of trades across a set of exchanges of unknown but independently distributed liquidity. In Ganchev
et al. [13], the authors design an optimal allocation algorithm under the censored feedback of the precision
model. It is straightforward to map their setting onto ours, but they assume independence between different
exchanges, while the candidate distributions in our setting need not be independent. Regardless, we show
that their allocation algorithm can be used to compute an optimal allocation (ignoring fairness) even when
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the independence assumption is relaxed (see Remark 1). Later, Agarwal et al. [1] extend the dark pool
problem to an adversarial (rather than distributional) setting. This is quite closely related to the work of
Ensign et al. [12] who also consider the precision model (under a different name) in an adversarial predictive
policing setting. They provide no-regret algorithms for this setting by reducing the problem to learning in a
partial monitoring environment. Since their setting is equivalent to that of Agarwal et al. [1], the algorithms
in Agarwal et al. [1] can be directly applied to the problem studied by Ensign et al. [12].
Our desire to study the natural greedy algorithm rather than an algorithm which uses “unreasonable”
allocations during an exploration phase is an instance of a general concern about exploration in fairness-
related problems [5]. Recent works have studied the performance of greedy algorithms in different settings
for this reason [2, 18, 24].
Lastly, the term fair allocation appears in the fair division literature (see e.g. [23] for a survey), but that
body of work is technically quite distinct from the problem we study here.
2 Setting
We study an allocator who has V units of a resource and is tasked with distributing them across a population
partitioned into G groups. Each group is divided into candidates, who are the individuals the allocator would
like to receive the resource, and non-candidates, who are the remaining individuals. We let mi denote the
total number of individuals in group i. The number of candidates ci in group i is a random variable drawn
from a fixed but unknown distribution Ci called the (marginal) candidate distribution. We do not make
any assumptions about the relationship between the candidate distributions across different groups and in
particular these distributions need not be independent. We use M to denote the total size of all groups (i.e.,
M = Σi∈[G]mi). An allocation v = (v1, . . . , vG) is a partitioning of these V units, where vi ∈ {0, . . . ,V}
denotes the units of resources allocated to group i. Every allocation is bound by a feasibility constraint
which requires that Σi∈[G]vi ≤ V.
A discovery model is a (possibly randomized) function disc(vi, ci) mapping the number of units vi allocated
to group i and the number of candidates ci in group i to the number of candidates discovered in group i. In
the learning setting, upon fixing an allocation v, the learner will get to observe (a realization of) disc(vi, ci)
for the realized value of ci for each group i. Fixing an allocation v, a discovery model disc(·) and candidate
distributions for all groups C = {Ci : i ∈ [G]}, we define the total expected number of discovered candidates,
χ(v,disc(·), C), as
χ (v,disc(·), C) =
∑
i∈[G]
E
ci∼Ci
[
disc(vi, ci)
]
, (1)
where the expectation is taken over Ci and any randomization in the discovery model disc(·). When the
discovery model and the candidate distributions are fixed, we will simply write χ(v) for brevity. We also
use the total expected number of discovered candidates and (expected) utility exchangeably. We refer to an
allocation that maximizes the expected number of discovered candidates over all feasible allocations as an
optimal allocation and denote it by w∗.
2.1 Allocative Fairness
For the purposes of this paper, we say that an allocation is fair if it satisfies approximate equality of candidate
discovery probability across groups. We call this discovery probability for brevity. This formalizes the intuition
that it is unfair if candidates in one group have an inherently higher probability of receiving the resource
than candidates in another. Formally, we define our notion of allocative fairness as follows.
Definition 1. Fix a discovery model disc(·) and the candidate distributions C. For an allocation v, let
fi (vi,disc(·), Ci) = E
ci∼Ci
[
disc (vi, ci)
ci
]
,
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denote the expected probability that a random candidate from group i receives a unit of the resource at
allocation v (i.e. the discovery probability in group i). Then for any α ∈ [0, 1], v is α-fair if∣∣∣fi (vi,disc(·), Ci)− fj (vj ,disc(·), Cj) ∣∣∣ ≤ α,
for all pairs of groups i and j.
When it is clear from the context, for brevity, we write fi(vi) for the discovery probability in group i. We
emphasize that this definition (1) depends crucially on the chosen discovery model, and (2) requires nothing
about the treatment of non-candidates. We think of this as a minimal definition of fairness, in that one
might want to further constrain the treatment of non-candidates — but we do not consider that extension.
Since discovery probabilities fi(vi) and fj(vj) are in [0, 1], the absolute value of their difference is in [0, 1].
By setting α = 1 we impose no fairness constraints whatsoever on the allocations, and by setting α = 0 we
require exact fairness.
We refer to an allocation v that maximizes χ(v) subject to α-fairness and the feasibility constraint as an
optimal α-fair allocation and denote it by wα. In general, χ(wα) is a non-increasing quantity in α, since as
α diminishes, the utility maximization problem becomes more constrained.4
Remark 1. We note that both the utility and discovery probabilities can be written solely in terms of the
marginal candidate distributions in each of the groups, even when these distributions are not independent.
This is because we have (implicitly) assumed that the number of candidates discovered in a group depends
only on the number of candidates in the group and the allocation to that group, regardless of the allocations
to and the number of candidates in other groups. This assumption together with the linearity of expectation
allows us to write the expected utility as in the right hand side of Equation 1.
3 The Precision Discovery Model
We begin by describing the precision model of discovery. Allocating vi units to group i in the precision
model results in the discovery of disc(ci, vi) , min(ci, vi) candidates. This models the ability to perfectly
discover and reach candidates in a group with resources deployed to that group, limited only by the number
of deployed resources and the number of candidates present.
The precision model results in censored observations that have a particularly intuitive form. Recall that
in general, a learning algorithm at each round gets to choose an allocation v and then observes disc(vi, ci)
for each group i. In the precision model, this results in the following kind of observation: when vi is larger
than ci, the allocator learns the number of candidates ci present on that day exactly. We refer to this kind
of feedback as an uncensored observation. But when vi is smaller than ci, all the allocator learns is that the
number of candidates is at least vi. We refer to this kind of feedback as a censored observation.
The rest of this section is organized as follows. In Sections 3.1 and 3.2 we characterize optimal and
optimal fair allocations for the precision model when the candidate distributions are known. In Section 3.3
we focus on learning an optimal fair allocation when these distributions are unknown. We show that any
learning algorithm that is guaranteed to find a fair allocation in the worst case over candidate distributions
must have the undesirable property that at some point, it must allocate a vast number of its resources to each
group individually. To bypass this hurdle, in Section 3.4 we show that when the candidate distributions have
a parametric form, a natural greedy algorithm which always uses an optimal fair allocation for the current
maximum likelihood estimates of the candidate distributions converges to an optimal fair allocation.
3.1 Optimal Allocation
We first describe how an optimal allocation (absent fairness constraints) can be computed efficiently when
the candidate distributions Ci are known. In Ganchev et al. [13], the authors provide an algorithm for
4In Appendix A, we show how to compute wα for any arbitrary but known candidate distributions C and known discovery
model disc(·) in a relaxation where the feasibility constraint is satisfied in expectation.
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computing an optimal allocation when the distributions over the number of shares present in each dark pool
are known and the trader wishes to maximize the expected number of traded shares. While they assume that
the distributions of shares across different dark pools are independent, our formulation does not require this
assumption of independence. Regardless, we can use the same algorithm as in Ganchev et al. [13] to compute
an optimal allocation in our setting; this is because, as stated in Remark 1, the utility in both settings can
be written solely in terms of the (marginal) candidate distributions even when the candidate distributions
are not independent across different groups. Here, we present the high level ideas of their algorithm in the
language of our model, and provide full details for completeness in Appendix B.
Let Ti(c) = Prci∼Ci [ci ≥ c] denote the probability that there are at least c candidates in group i. We
refer to Ti(c) as the tail probability of Ci at c. Recall that the value of the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of Ci at c is defined to be
Fi(c) =
∑
c′≤c
Prci∼Ci [ci = c
′] .
So Ti(c) can be written in terms of CDF values as Ti(c) = 1−Fi(c− 1).
First, observe that the expected total number of candidates discovered by an allocation in the precision
model can be written in terms of the tail probabilities of the candidate distributions i.e.
χ(v,disc(·), C) =
∑
i∈[G]
E
ci∼Ci
[min (vi, ci)] =
∑
i∈[G]
vi∑
c=1
Ti(c).
Since the objective function is concave (as Ti(c) is a non-increasing function in c for all i), a greedy algorithm
which iteratively allocates the next unit of the resource to a group in
arg max
i∈[G]
(Ti (vti + 1)− Ti (vti)) ,
where vti is the current allocation to group i in the t
th round achieves an optimal allocation.
3.2 Optimal Fair Allocation
We next show how to compute an optimal α-fair allocation in the precision model when the candidate
distributions are known and do not need to be learned.
To build intuition for how the algorithm works, imagine that the group i has the highest discovery
probability in wα, and the allocation wαi to that group is somehow known to the algorithm ahead of time.
The constraint of α-fairness then implies that the discovery probability for each other group j in wα must
satisfy fj ∈ [fi−α, fi]. This in turn implies upper and lower bounds on the feasible allocations wαj to group
j. The algorithm is then simply a constrained greedy algorithm: subject to these implied constraints, it
iteratively allocates units so as to maximize their marginal probability of reaching another candidate. Since
the group i maximizing the discovery probability in wα and the corresponding allocation wαi are not known
ahead of time, the algorithm simply iterates through each possible choice of i.
Pseudocode is given in Algorithm 1. We prove that Algorithm 1 returns an optimal α-fair allocation in
Theorem 1. We defer the proof of Theorem 1 and all the other omitted proofs in the section to Appendix B.
Theorem 1. Algorithm 1 computes an optimal α-fair allocation for the precision model in time O(GV(GV+
M)).
3.3 Learning Fair Allocations Generally Requires Brute-Force Exploration
In Sections 3.1 and 3.2 we assumed the candidate distributions were known. When the candidate distributions
are unknown, learning algorithms intending to converge to optimal α-fair allocations must learn a sufficient
amount about the distributions in question to certify the fairness of the allocation they finally output.
Because learners must deal with feedback in the censored observation model, this places constraints on how
6
Algorithm 1 Computing an optimal fair allocation in the precision model
Input: α, C and V.
Output: An optimal α-fair allocation wα.
wα ← ~0. . Initialize the output.
χmax ← 0. . Keep track of the utility of the output.
for i ∈ [G] do . Guess for group with the highest probability of discovery.
v← ~0.
for vi ∈ {0, . . .V} do . Guess for the allocation to that group.
Set vi in v and compute fi(vi).
ubi ← vi. . Upper bound on allocation to group i.
lbi ← vi. . Lower bound on allocation to group i.
for j 6= i, j ∈ [G] do . Upper and lower bounds for other groups.
Update lbj and ubj using fi(vi), α and Cj .
vj ← lbj . . Assign the lower bound allocation to group j.
if Σi∈[G]vi > V then
continue. . Allocation is not feasible.
Vr = V − Σi∈[G]vi
for t = 1, . . . ,Vr do . Allocate the remaining resources greedily while obeying fairness.
j∗ ∈ arg max
j∈[G]
(Tj(vj + 1)− Tj(vj)) s.t. vj < ubj .
vj∗ ← vj∗ + 1.
χ(v) = Σi∈[G]Σ
vi
c=1Ti(c). . Compute the utility of v.
if χ(v) > χmax then . Update the best α-fair allocation found so far.
χmax ← χ(v).
wα ← v.
return wα.
they can proceed. Unfortunately, as we show in this section, if candidate distributions are allowed to be
worst-case, this will force a learner to engage in what we call “brute-force exploration” — the iterative
deployment of a large fraction of the resources to each subgroup in turn. This is formalized in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. Define m∗ = maxi∈[G]mi to be the size of the largest group and assume mi > 6 for all i and
G ≥ 2. Let α ∈ [0, 1/(2m∗)), δ ∈ (0, 1/2), and A be any learning algorithm for the precision model which
runs for a finite number of rounds and outputs an allocation. Suppose that there is some group i for which
A has not allocated at least mi/2 units for at least k ln(1/δ)/(αmi) rounds upon termination, where k is an
absolute constant. Then there exists a candidate distribution such that, with probability at least δ, A outputs
an allocation that is not α-fair.
Sketch of the Proof. Let i denote a group in which A has not allocated at least mi/2 units for at least
k ln(1/δ)/(αmi) rounds upon its termination and let v denote an arbitrary allocation. We will design two
candidate distributions for group i which have true discovery probabilities that are at least 2α apart given
vi, but which are indistinguishable given the observations of the algorithm with probability at least δ. If the
A cannot distinguish between Ci and C′i, it cannot distinguish between fi and f ′i , and thus cannot guarantee
whether group i’s discovery probability is indeed within α of every other group’s discovery probability.
To design these candidate distributions, consider distributions Ci and C′i which satisfy the following four
conditions.
1. Ci and C′i agree on all values less than mi/2− 2.
2. The total mass of both distributions below mi/2− 2 is 1− 2αmi.
3. The remaining 2αmi mass of Ci is on the value mi/2− 1.
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4. The remaining 2αmi mass of C′i is on the value mi.
Distinguishing between Ci and C′i requires at least one uncensored observation beyond mi/2−2. However,
conditioned on allocating at least mi/2 units, the probability of observing an uncensored observation is at
most 2αmi. So to distinguish between Ci and C′i with confidence 1− δ, and therefore to guarantee an α-fair
allocation, a learning algorithm must allocate at least mi/2 units to group i for k ln(1/δ)/(αmi) rounds.
Recall that we used m∗ to denote the size of the largest group. When m∗ > 2V, then Theorem 2
implies that no algorithm can guarantee α-fairness for sufficiently small α. Moreover, even when m∗ ≤
2V, Theorem 2 shows that in general, if we want algorithms that have provable guarantees for arbitrary
candidate distributions, it is impossible to avoid something akin to brute-force search (recall that there is a
trivial algorithm which simply allocates all resources to each group in turn, for sufficiently many rounds to
approximately learn the CDF of the candidate distribution, and then solves the offline problem). In the next
section, we circumvent this by giving an algorithm with provable guarantees, assuming that the candidate
distributions have a known parametric form.
3.4 Poisson Distributions and Convergence of the MLE
In this section, we assume that all the candidate distributions have a particular and known parametric form
but that the parameters of the these distributions are not known to the allocator. Concretely, we assume
that the candidate distribution for each group is Poisson5 (denoted by C(λ)) and write λ∗ = (λ∗1, . . . , λ∗G) for
the true underlying parameters of the candidate distributions; this choice appears justified, at least in the
predictive policing application, as the candidate distributions in the Philadelphia Crime Incidents dataset are
well-approximated by Poisson distributions (see Section 4 for further discussion). This assumption allows
an algorithm to learn the tails of these distributions without needing to rely on brute-force search, thus
circumventing the limitation given in Theorem 2. Indeed, we show that (a small variant of) the natural
greedy algorithm incorporating these distributional assumptions converges to an optimal fair allocation.
For simplicity, we assume a parametric form on the marginal candidate distribution in each of the
groups. We could have equivalently assumed that the candidates across groups are drawn from a multivariate
Poisson distribution to highlight the (potential) correlation between candidates distributions. However, since
for a given multivariate Poisson distribution the marginal distribution on each group is itself a Poisson
distribution [15], we made our parametric assumption directly on these marginal distributions.
At a high level, in each round, our algorithm uses Algorithm 1 to calculate an optimal fair allocation
with respect to the current maximum likelihood estimates of the group distributions; then, it uses the new
observations it obtains from this allocation to refine these estimates for the next round. This is summarized
in Algorithm 2. The algorithm differs from this pure greedy strategy in one respect, to overcome the following
subtlety: there is a possibility that Algorithm 1, when operating on a preliminary estimate for the candidate
distributions, will suggest sending zero units to some group, even when the optimal allocation for the true
distributions sends some units to every group. Such a deployment would result in the algorithm receiving
no feedback for the zero-allocated group that round. If this suggestion is followed and a lack of feedback is
allowed to persist indefinitely, the algorithm’s parameter estimate for the zero-allocated group will also stop
updating — potentially at an incorrect value. In order to avoid this problem and continue making progress
in learning, our algorithm chooses another allocation in this case. As we show, any allocation that allocates
positive resources to all groups will suffice; in particular, our algorithm makes the natural choice of simply
repeating the allocation from the previous round.
Notice that Algorithm 2 chooses an allocation at every round which is fair with respect to its estimates
of the parameters of the candidate distributions; hence, asymptotic convergence of its output to an optimal
α-fair allocation follows directly from the convergence of the estimates to true parameters. However, we
seek a stronger, finite sample guarantee, as stated in Theorem 3.
5To match our model, we would technically need to assume a truncated Poisson distribution to satisfy the bounded support
condition. However, the distinction will not be important for the analysis, and so to minimize technical overhead, we perform
the analysis assuming an untruncated Poisson.
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Algorithm 2 Learning an optimal fair allocation
Input: α, V and T (total number of rounds).
Output: An allocation vT+1 and estimates to parameters {λTi }.
v1 ← (b(V/G)c, . . . , b(V/G)c). . Allocate uniformly.
for rounds t = 1, . . . , T do
if ∃i such that vti == 0 then . Check whether every group is allocated a resource.
vt ← vt−1.
Observe oti = min{vti , cti} for each group.
for i = 1, . . . ,G do
Update history ht+1i with o
t
i and v
t
i .
λˆti ← arg maxλ∈[λmin,λmax] Lˆ(ht+1i , λ). . Solve the maximum likelihood estimation problem.
vt+1 ← Algorithm 1(α, {C(λˆti)},V). . Compute an allocation to be deployed in the next round.
return vT+1 and {λTi }.
Theorem 3. Let , δ > 0. Suppose that the candidate distributions are Poisson distributions with unknown
parameters in the vector λ∗, where λ∗ lies in the known interval [λmin, λmax]G. Suppose we run Algorithm 2
for t > O˜(ln(G/δ)/(η())2) , Tmax rounds, where η(·) is some distribution specific function6 to get an
allocation vˆ and estimated parameters λˆi for all groups i. Then with probability at least 1− δ
1. For all i in [G], |λˆi − λ∗i | ≤ .
2. Let D = maxi∈[G]DTV (C(λ∗i ), C(λˆi)) where DTV denotes the total variation distance between two dis-
tributions. Then vˆ
• is (α+ 4D)-fair.
• has utility at most 4DGV smaller than the utility of an optimal (α − 4D)-fair allocation i.e.
χ(vˆ) ≥ χ(wα−4D)− 4DGV.
Remark 2. Theorem 3 implies that in the limit, the allocation from Algorithm 2 will converge to an optimal
α-fair allocation. As t→∞, λˆi p→ λ∗i for all i, meaning D → 0 and more importantly, vˆ will be α-fair and
optimal.
The rest of this section is dedicated to the proof of Theorem 3. First, we introduce notation. Since we
assumed the candidate distribution for each group is Poisson, the probability mass function (PMF) and the
CDF of the candidate distribution Ci for group i can be written as
Prci∼C(λ∗i ) [ci = c;λ
∗
i ] =
λ∗i
ce−λ
∗
i
c!
and F (c;λ∗i ) = Prci∼C(λ∗i ) [ci ≤ c;λ∗i ] = e−λ
∗
i
c∑
x=0
λ∗i
x
x!
.
Given an allocation of vi units of the resource to group i we use oi to denote the (possibly censored)
observation received by Algorithm 2. So while the candidates in group i are generated according to C(λ∗i ),
the observations of Algorithm 2 follow a censored Poisson distribution which we abbreviate by Co(λ∗i , vi).
We can write the PMF of this distribution as
Proi∼Co(λ∗i ,vi)[oi = o;λ
∗
i , vi] =
{
λ∗i
oe−λ
∗
i
o! , o < vi,
1− F (vi − 1;λ∗i ), o = vi,
where F (vi − 1;λ∗i ) is the CDF value of C(λ∗i ) at vi − 1.
Since Algorithm 2 operates in rounds, we use the superscript t throughout to denote the round. For each
round t, denote the history of the units allocated to group i and observations received (candidates discovered)
6See Corollary 3 in Appendix B for the relationship between η and . Also O˜ hides poly-logarithmic terms in 1/η().
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in rounds up to t by hti = (v
1
i , o
1
i , . . . , v
t−1
i , o
t−1
i ). We use h
t = (ht1, . . . , h
t
G) to denote the history for all
groups. All the probabilities and expectations in this section are over the randomness of the observations
drawn from the censored Poisson distributions unless otherwise noted; we suppress related notation for
brevity. Finally, an allocation function A in round t is a mapping from the history of all groups ht to the
number of units to be allocated to each group i.e. A : ht → vt. For convenience, we use A(ht)i to denote
the allocation vti at round t. We are now ready to define the likelihood functions.
Definition 2. Let p(vti , o
t
i;λ) := Pr[o
t
i;λ, v
t
i ] denote the (censored) likelihood of discovering o
t
i candidates
given an allocation vti to group i assuming the candidate distribution follows C(λ). We write `(vti , oti;λ) as
log p(vti , o
t
i;λ). So, given any history h
t, the empirical log-likelihood function for group i is
Lˆi
(
ht, λ
)
=
1
t
t∑
s=1
` (A(hs)i, osi ;λ) .
The expected log-likelihood function given the history of allocations but over the randomness of the candidacy
distribution can be written as
L∗i
(
ht, λ
)
=
1
t
t∑
s=1
E [` (A(hs)i, osi ;λ)] ,
where the expectation is over the randomness of osi drawn from Co(λ∗,A(hs)i).
Proof of Theorem 3
To prove Theorem 3, we first show that any sequence of allocations selected by Algorithm 2 will eventually
recover the true parameters. There are two conceptual difficulties here: the first is that standard convergence
results typically leverage the assumption of independence, which does not hold in this case as Algorithm 2
computes adaptive allocations which depend on the allocations in previous rounds; the second is the censoring
of the observations. Despite these difficulties, we give quantifiable rates with which the estimates converge
to the true parameters. Next, we show that computing an optimal α-fair allocation using the estimated
parameters will result in an allocation that is (α+ 4D)-fair with respect to the true candidate distributions
where D denotes the maximum total variation distance between the true and estimated Poisson distributions
across all groups. Finally, we show that this allocation also achieves a utility that is comparable to the utility
of an optimal (α−4D)-fair allocation. We note that while Theorem 3 is only stated for Poisson distributions,
our results can be generalized to any single parameter Lipschitz-continuous family of distributions (see
Remark 3).
Closeness of the Estimated Parameters Our argument can be stated at a high level as follows: for
any group i and any history ht, the empirical log-likelihood converges to the expected log-likelihood for any
sequence of allocations made by Algorithm 2 as formalized in Lemma 1. We then show in Lemma 2 that
the closeness of the empirical and expected log-likelihoods implies that the maximizers of these quantities
(corresponding to the estimated and true parameters) will also become close. Since in our analysis we
consider the groups separately, we fix a group i throughout the rest of this section and drop the subscript i
for convenience.
We start by studying the rate of convergence of the empirical log-likelihood to the expected log-likelihood.
Lemma 1. With probability at least 1− δ/G, for any t and any ht observed by Algorithm 2
sup
λ∈[λmin,λmax]
∣∣∣Lˆ (ht, λ)− L∗ (ht, λ)∣∣∣ ≤ O(√ ln(tG/δ)
t
)
.
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The true and estimated parameters for each group correspond to the maximizers of the expected and
empirical log-likelihoods, respectively (see Corollary 1 in Appendix B). We next show that closeness of the
empirical and expected log-likelihoods implies that the true and estimated parameters are also close.
Lemma 2. Let λˆ denote the estimate of the Algorithm 2 after Tmax rounds. Then with probability at least
1− δ/G, |λˆ− λ∗| < .
Proof. Since Corollary 1(in Appendix B) gives that L(ht, λ) has a unique maximizer at λ∗ and Corollary 3(in
Appendix B) gives that there exists some η() so that for any λ′ such that |L∗(ht, λ′)− L∗(ht, λ∗)| < η(),
we must have that |λ′ − λ∗| < . We denote η() by η for brevity. We define the empirical maximizer λˆ to
be the maximizer of Lˆ(ht, λ) i.e.
λˆ ∈ arg max
λ∈[λmin,λmax]
Lˆ (ht, λ) . (2)
Applying Lemma 1 implies that for any ht with t > Tmax and λ
′ ∈ [λmin, λmax], with probability at least
1− δ/G, ∣∣∣Lˆ(ht, λ′)− L∗(ht, λ′)∣∣∣ < η
2
.
In particular, we must have that∣∣∣Lˆ (ht, λ∗)− L∗ (ht, λ∗)∣∣∣ < η
2
and
∣∣∣Lˆ(ht, λˆ)− L∗ (ht, λˆ)∣∣∣ < η
2
. (3)
Since λˆ is a maximizer of Equation 2, we have that
Lˆ
(
ht, λˆ
)
≥ Lˆ (ht, λ∗) ≥ L∗ (ht, λ∗)− η
2
,
where the last inequality is by Equation 3. This implies that
L∗
(
ht, λˆ
)
> Lˆ
(
ht, λˆ
)
− η
2
> L∗ (ht, λ∗)− η
2
− η
2
= L∗ (ht, λ∗)− η,
where the last inequality is by Equation 3. So L∗(ht, λˆ) > L∗(ht, λ∗) − η, and thus Corollary 3 gives that
|λˆ− λ∗| < .
Combining Lemma 2 with a union bound over all groups show that, with probability 1− δ, if Algorithm
2 is run for Tmax rounds, then |λˆi − λ∗i | < , for all i. Note that as t → ∞, the maximum total variation
distance D between the estimated and the true distribution will converge in probability to 0.
Fairness of the Allocation In this section, we show that the fairness violation (i.e. the maximum
difference in discovery probabilities over all pairs of groups) is linear in terms of D. Therefore, as the
running time of the Algorithm 2 increases and hence, D → 0, the fairness violation of vˆ approaches α. This
is stated formally as follows.
Lemma 3. Let vˆ denote the allocation returned by Algorithm 2 after Tmax rounds. Then with probability at
least 1− δ, |fi(vˆi)− fj(vˆj)| ≤ α+ 4D,∀i, j ∈ [G].
Proof. For any i, j ∈ [G] we have that
|fi(vˆi)− fj(vˆj)| =
∣∣fi(vˆi, C(λ∗i ))− fj(vˆj , C(λ∗j ))∣∣
≤
∣∣∣fi(vˆi, C(λ∗i ))− fi(vˆi, C(λˆi))∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣fi(vˆi, C(λˆi))− fj(vˆj , C(λˆj))∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣fj(vˆj , C(λ∗j ))− fj(vˆj , C(λˆj))∣∣∣
≤ 2DTV (C(λ∗i ), C(λˆi)) + α+ 2DTV (C(λ∗j ), C(λˆj))
= α+ 4D.
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The first inequality follows from the triangle inequality. In the second inequality, the second term can be
bounded because Algorithm 1 returns an α-fair allocation with respect to its input distribution. The first
and third term in the second inequality can be bounded by Lemma 12 (in Appendix B). Lemma 12 shows
that for any fixed allocation the difference between the discovery probability with respect to the true and
estimated candidate distributions in group i is proportional to the total variation distance between the true
and estimated distributions.
Utility of the Allocation In this section we analyze the utility of the allocation returned by Algorithm 2.
Once again, note that as D → 0, which happens as the running time of Algorithm 2 increases, vˆ will become
optimal and α-fair.
Lemma 4. Let vˆ denote the allocation returned by Algorithm 2 after Tmax rounds. Then with probability at
least 1− δ, χ(vˆ) > χ(wα−4D)− 4DGV.
Proof. Consider the following optimization problem, P(α, {λi}, {λ¯i},V).
max
v
χ (v, {C(λi)}) ,
subject to
∣∣fi (vi, C(λ¯i))− fj (vj , C(λ¯i))∣∣ ≤ α,∀i and j,∑
i∈[G]
vi ≤ V,
vi ∈ N .
We can think of the above optimization problem as the case where the underlying candidate distributions used
for the objective value and the fairness constraints are different. Let us write A(α, {λi}, {λ¯i},V) to denote
an optimal allocation in the above optimization problem, P(α, {λi}, {λ¯i},V). So an optimal fair allocation
and the allocation returned by Algorithm 2 can be written as A(α, {λ∗i }, {λ∗i },V) and A(α, {λˆi}, {λˆi},V),
respectively.
Note that for any fixed allocation v∣∣∣χ(v, {C(λ∗i )})− χ(v, {C(λˆi)})∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈G
vi∑
c=0
T ∗i (c)−
∑
i∈G
vi∑
c=0
Tˆi(c)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2GVD, (4)
where Tˆi is the tail probability of C(λˆi). This is because |T ∗i (c) − Tˆi(c)| ≤ 2DTV (C(λi), C(λˆi)). In other
words, even when the underlying candidate distribution changes for the objective value, an allocation value
can change by at most 2GVD.
Now observe that
χ(vˆ, {C(λ∗i )}) ≥ χ(vˆ, {C(λˆi)})− 2GVD = χ
(
A
(
V, {C(λˆi)}, {C(λˆi)}, α
)
, {C(λˆi)}
)
− 2GVD
≥ χ
(
A
(
V, {C(λˆi)}, {C(λ∗i )}, α− 4D
)
, {C(λˆi)}
)
− 2GVD
≥ χ (A (V, {C(λ∗i )}, {C(λ∗i )}, α− 4D) , {C(λ∗i )})− 4GVD
= χ(wα−4D)− 4DGV.
The inequalities in the first and third lines are by Equation 4, which shows how the utility deteriorates when
the underlying distribution for the objective function changes. The inequality in the second line follows
from Lemma 3, as any (α − 4D) fair allocation is a feasible allocation to P(V, {C(λˆi)}, {C(λˆi)}, α), and
A(α, {λi}, {λ¯i},V) is an optimal solution to this problem.
Remark 3. Although we assumed Poisson distributions in this section, all our results hold for any single-
parameter Lipschitz-continuous distribution whose parameter is drawn from a compact set. However, the
convergence rate of Theorem 3 depends on the quantity η() which depends on the family of distributions
used to model the candidate distributions.
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4 Experiments
In this section, we apply our allocation and learning algorithms for the precision model to the Philadelphia
Crime Incidents dataset, and complement the theoretical convergence guarantee of Algorithm 2 to an optimal
fair allocation with empirical evidence suggesting fast convergence in practice. We also study the empirical
trade-off between fairness and utility in the dataset.
4.1 Experimental Design
The Philadelphia Crime Incidents dataset7 contains all the crimes reported to the Police Department’s
INCT system between 2006 and 2016. The crimes are divided into two types. Type I crimes include violent
offenses such as aggravated assault, rape, and arson among others. Type II crimes include simple assault,
prostitution, gambling and fraud. For simplicity, we aggregate all crime of both types, but in practice, an
actual police department would of course treat different categories of crime differently. We note as a caveat
that these incidents are reported and may not represent the entirety of committed crimes.
Figure 1: Frequencies of the number of reported crimes in each district in the Philadelphia Crime Incidents
dataset. The red curves display the best Poisson fit to the data.
To create daily crime frequencies in Figure 1, we first calculate the daily counts of criminal incidents in
each of the 21 geographical police districts in Philadelphia by grouping together all the crime reports with
the same date; we then normalize these counts to get frequencies.8 Each subfigure in Figure 1 represents
a police district. The horizontal axis of the subfigure corresponds to the number of reported incidents in a
day and the vertical axis represents the frequency of each number on the horizontal axis. These frequencies
approximate the true (marginal) distributions of the number of reported crimes in each of the districts in
Philadelphia. Therefore, throughout this section we take these frequencies as the ground truth candidate
distributions for the number of reported incidents in each of the districts.
Figure 1 shows that crime distributions in different districts can be quite different; e.g., the average
number of daily reported incidents in District 15 is 43.5, which is much higher than the average of 11.35
7https://www.opendataphilly.org/dataset/crime-incidents accessed 2018-05-16.
8The current list of 21 districts can be found at https://www.phillypolice.com/districts-units/index.html. The dataset
however contains 25 districts from which we removed 4 from consideration. Districts with identifiers 77 and 92 correspond to
the airport and parks, so the crime incident counts in these districts are significantly different from the rest of the districts.
Moreover, we removed districts with identifiers 4 and 23 which were both dissolved in 2010.
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in District 1 (see Table 1 in Appendix C for more details). Despite these differences, each of the crime
distributions can be approximated well by a Poisson distribution. The red curves overlayed in each subfigure
correspond to the Poisson distribution obtained via maximum likelihood estimation on data from that
district. Throughout, we refer to such distributions as the best Poisson fit to the data (see Table 2 in
Appendix C for details about the goodness of fit).
In our experiments, we take the police officers assigned to the districts as the resource to be distributed,
the ground truth crime frequencies as candidate distributions, and aim to maximize the sum of the number
of crimes discovered under the precision model of discovery.
4.2 Results
We can quantify the extent to which fairness degrades utility in the dataset through a notion we call Price of
Fairness (PoF henceforth). In particular, given the ground truth crime distributions and the precision model
of discovery, for a fairness level α, we define PoF(α) = χ(w∗)/χ(wα). The PoF is simply the ratio of the
expected number of crimes discovered by an optimal allocation to the expected number of crimes discovered
by an optimal α-fair allocation. Since χ(w∗) ≥ χ(wα) for all α, the PoF is at least one. Furthermore, the PoF
is monotonically non-increasing in α. We can apply the algorithms given in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 respectively
for computing optimal unconstrained, and optimal fair allocations with the with ground truth distributions
as input and numerically compute the PoF. This is illustrated in Figure 2. The x axis corresponds to different
α values and the y axis displays 1/PoF(α). Each curve corresponds to a different number of total police
officers denoted by V. Because feasible allocations must be integral, there can sometimes be no feasible α-fair
allocation for small α. Since the PoF in these cases is infinite we instead opt to display the inverse, 1/PoF,
which is always bounded in [0, 1]. Higher values of inverse PoF are more desirable.
Figure 2: Inverse PoF plots for the Philadelphia Crime Incidents dataset. Smaller values indicate greater
sacrifice in utility to meet the fairness constraint.
Figure 2 shows a diverse set of utility/fairness trade-offs depending on the number of available police
officers. It also illustrates that the cost of fairness is rather low in most regimes. For example, in the worst
case, with only 50 police officers (the black curve) (which is much smaller than the average number of daily
reported crimes: 563.88), the inverse PoF is 1 for α ≥ 0.1, which corresponds to a 10% difference in the
discovery probability across districts. When we increase the number of available police officers to 400 (the
magenta curve), tolerating only a 4% difference in the discovery probability across districts is sufficient to
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guarantee no loss in the utility. Figure 2 also shows that for any fixed α, the inverse PoF(α) tends to
increase as the number of police increases (i.e. the cost of fairness decreases).9 This captures the intuition
that fairness becomes a less costly constraint when resources are in greater supply. Finally, we observe
a thresholding phenomenon in Figure 2; in each curve, increasing α beyond a threshold will significantly
increase the inverse PoF. This is due to discretization effects, since only integral allocations are feasible.
We next turn into analyzing the performance of Algorithm 2 in practice. We run the algorithm instanti-
ated to fit Poisson distributions, but use observations from the ground truth distribution at each round. As
we have shown in Figure 1 and Table 2, the ground truth is well approximated by a Poisson distribution.
We measure the performance of Algorithm 2 as follows. First, we fix a police budget V and unfairness
budget α and run Algorithm 2 for 2000 rounds using the dataset as the ground truth. That is, we simu-
late each round’s crime count realizations in each of the districts as being sampled from the ground truth
distributions, and return censored observations under the precision model to Algorithm 2 according to the
algorithm’s allocations and the drawn realizations. The algorithm returns an allocation after termination
and we can measure the expected number of crimes discovered and fairness violation (the maximum differ-
ence in discovery probabilities over all pairs of districts) of the returned allocation using the ground truth
distributions. Varying α while fixing V allows us to trace out the Pareto frontier of the utility/fairness
trade-off for a fixed police budget. Similarly, for any fixed V and α, we can run Algorithm 1 (the offline
algorithm for computing an optimal fair allocation) with the ground truth distributions as input and trace
out a Pareto curve by varying α. We refer to these two Pareto curves by the learned and optimal Pareto
curves, respectively.10 So to measure the performance of Algorithm 2, we can compare the learned and
optimal Pareto curves.
Figure 3: Pareto frontier of expected crimes discovered versus fairness violation.
In Figure 3, each curve corresponds to a police budget. The x and y axes represent the expected number of
crimes discovered and fairness violation for allocations on the Pareto frontier, respectively. In our simulations
we varied α between 0 and 0.15. For each police budget V, the ‘x’ s connected by the dashed lines show the
learning Pareto frontier. Similarly, the circles connected by solid lines show the optimal Pareto frontier. We
9There are exceptions to this observation – for example, in the regime when α is between 0.03 and 0.04, the inverse PoF
decreases as V increases from 100 to 200. This occurs because only integral allocations are feasible, so achieving a particular
fairness level may require leaving some resources unallocated until significantly more resources become available; increasing V
in this regime improves the utility of an optimal allocation while leaving the utility of an optimal fair allocation unchanged.
10We can also generate fitted Pareto curves using best Poisson fit distributions instead of the ground truth distributions.
These curves look very similar to the optimal Pareto curves (see Figure 5 in Appendix C).
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point out that while it is possible for the fairness violations in the learned Pareto curves to be higher than
the level of α set as an input to Algorithm 2, the fairness violations in the optimal Pareto curves are always
bounded by α.
The disparity between the optimal and learned Pareto curves are due to the fact that the learning
algorithm has not yet fully converged. This can be attributed to the large number of censored observations
received by Algorithm 2, which are significantly less informative than uncensored observations. Censoring
happens frequently because the number of police used in every case plotted is less than the daily average of
563.88 crimes across all the districts in the dataset — so it is unavoidable that in any allocation, there will
be significant censoring in at least some districts.
Figure 3 shows that while the learning curves are dominated by the optimal curves, the performance of
the learning algorithm approaches the performance of the offline optimal allocation as V increases. Again,
this is because increasing V generally has the effect of decreasing the frequency of censoring.
We study the V = 500 regime in more detail, to explore the empirical rate of convergence. In Figure 4,
we study the round by round performance of the allocation computed by Algorithm 2 in a single run with
the choice of V = 500 and α = 0.05.
Figure 4: The per round expected number of crimes discovered and fairness violation of Algorithm 2. V = 500
and α = 0.05.
In Figure 4, the x axis labels progression of rounds of the algorithm. The y axis measures the fairness
violation (left) and expected number of crimes discovered (right) of the allocation deployed by the algorithm,
as measured with respect to the ground truth distributions. The black curves represent Algorithm 2. For
comparison we also show the same quantities for an offline optimal fair allocation as computed with respect
to the ground truth (red line), and an offline optimal fair allocation as computed with respect to the best
Poisson fit to the ground truth (blue line). Note that in the limit, the allocations chosen by Algorithm 2
are guaranteed to converge to the blue baselines — but not the red baseline, because the algorithm is itself
learning a Poisson approximation to the ground truth. The disparity between the red and blue lines quantifies
the degradation in performance due to using Poisson approximations, rather than due to non-convergence
of the learning process.
Figure 4 shows that Algorithm 2 converges to the Poisson approximation baseline well before the termi-
nation time of 2000, and substantially before the convergence bound guaranteed by our theory. Examining
the estimated Poisson parameters used internally by Algorithm 2 reveals that although the allocation has
converged to an optimal fair allocation, the estimated parameters have not yet converged to the parameters
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of the best Poisson fit in any of the districts. In particular, Algorithm 2 underestimates the parameters in
all of the districts — but the degree of the underestimation is systematic: the correlation coefficient between
the true and estimated parameters is 0.9975.
We see also in Figure 4 that convergence to the optimum expected number of discovered crimes occurs
more quickly than convergence to the target fairness violation level. This is also apparent in Figure 3 where
the learning and optimal Pareto curves are generally similar in terms of the maximum number of crimes
discovered, while the fairness violations are higher in the learning curves.
5 The Random Discovery Model
Finally, we consider the random model of discovery. In the random model, when vi units are allocated to
a group with ci candidates, the number of discovered candidates is a random variable corresponding to the
number of candidates that appear in a uniformly random sample of vi individuals from a group of size mi.
Equivalently, when vi units are allocated to a group of size mi with ci candidates, the number of candidates
discovered by disc(·) is a random variable disc(vi, ci) , oi, where oi is drawn from the hypergeometric
distribution with parameters mi, ci and vi. Furthermore, the expected number of candidates discovered
when allocating vi units to group i is E[disc(vi, ci)] = vi E[ci]/mi.
For simplicity, throughout this section, we assume mi ≥ V for all i. This assumption can be completely
relaxed (see the discussion in Appendix D). Moreover, let µi = E[ci]/mi denote the expected fraction of
candidates in group i. Without loss of generality, for the rest of this section, we assume µ1 ≥ µ2 ≥ . . . ≥ µG .
5.1 Optimal Allocation
In this section, we characterize optimal allocations. Note that the expected number of candidates discovered
by the allocation choice vi ≤ mi in group i is simply viµi. This suggests a simple algorithm to compute w∗:
allocating every unit of the resource to group 1. More generally, let G∗ = {i | µi = µ1} denote the subset
of groups with the highest expected number of candidates. An allocation is optimal if and only if it only
allocates all resources to groups in G∗.
5.2 Properties of Fair Allocations
We next discuss the properties of fair allocations in the random discovery model. First, we point out that
the discovery probability can be simplified as
fi(vi) = E
ci∼Ci
[
civi/mi
ci
]
=
vi
mi
.
So an allocation is α-fair in the random model if |vi/mi − vj/mj | ≤ α for all groups i and j. Therefore,
fair allocations (roughly) distribute resources in proportion to the size of the groups, essentially ignoring the
candidate distributions within each group. We defer the full characterization to Appendix D.
5.3 Price of Fairness
Recall that PoF quantifies the extent to which constraining the allocation to satisfy α-fairness degrades
utility. While in Section 4 we study the PoF on the Philadelphia Crime Incidents dataset, we can define a
worst-case variant as follows.
Definition 3. Fix the random model of crime discovery and let α ∈ [0, 1]. We define the PoF as
PoF(α) = max
C
χ(w∗, C)
χ(wα, C) .
where C ranges over all possible candidate distributions.
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We can fully characterize this worst-case PoF in the random discovery model. We defer the proof of
Theorem 4 to Appendix D.
Theorem 4. The PoF in the random discovery model is
PoF(α) =
{
1, Vm1 ≤ α,
M
m1+α(M−m1) ,
V
m1
> α.
The PoF in the random model can be as high as M/m1 in the worst case. If all groups are identically
sized, this grows linearly with the number of groups.
6 Conclusion and Future Directions
Our presentation of allocative fairness provides a family of fairness definitions, modularly parameterized by
a “discovery model”. What counts as “fair” depends a great deal on the choice of discovery model, which
makes explicit what would otherwise be unstated assumptions about the process of tasks like policing. The
random and precision models of discovery studied in this paper represent two extreme points of a spectrum.
In the predictive policing setting, the random model of discovery assumes that officers have no advantage
over random guessing when stopping individuals for further inspection. The precision model assumes they
can oracularly determine offenders, and stop only them. An interesting direction for future work is to study
discovery models that lie in between these two.
We have also made a number of simplifying assumptions that could be relaxed. For example, we assumed
the candidate distributions are stationary — fixed independently of the actions of the algorithm. Of course,
the deployment of police officers can change crime distributions. Modeling this kind of dynamics, and
designing learning algorithms that perform well in such dynamic settings would be interesting. Finally, we
have assumed that the same discovery model applies to all groups. One friction to fairness that one might
reasonably conjecture is that the discovery model may differ between groups — being closer to the precision
model for one group, and closer to the random model for another. We leave the study of these extensions to
future work.
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A Feasibility in Expectation
In this section, we show how to compute wα for any arbitrary but known candidate distributions C and
known discovery model disc(·) in a relaxation where the feasibility constraint is satisfied in expectation.
The first observation is that when disc(·) and C are both known, for a group i and allocation of j units
of resource to that group, the expected number of discovered candidates
discij = E
ci∼Ci
[disc(j, ci)] ,
and the discovery probability
fij = E
ci∼Ci
[
disc(j, ci)
ci
]
,
can both be computed exactly. The second observation is that when allowing the feasibility condition to
be satisfied in expectation, instead of allocating integral units of resources to each group, we can allocate
resources to a group using a distribution.
Let pij denote the probability that j units of resource is allocated to group i. We can compute w
α by
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writing the following linear program with pijs as variables.
max
pij
∑
i∈[G]
V∑
j=1
pij discij ,
subject to
∑
i∈[G]
V∑
j=1
pijj ≤ V,∣∣∣∣∣∣
V∑
j=1
pijfij −
V∑
j=1
pi′jfi′j
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ α,∀i and i′ ∈ [G],
V∑
j=1
pij = 1,∀j,
pij ≥ 0,∀i and j.
The objective function maximizes the number of candidates discovered given the allocation. The first
constraint guarantees that the allocation is feasible in expectation. The second constraint (which is linear
in pij) ensures that α-fairness is satisfied by the allocation. The last two constraints guarantees that for any
i, pij values define a valid probability distribution on all the possible allocations to group i.
B Omitted Details from Section 3
B.1 Omitted Details from Section 3.1
We first show how the expected number of discovered candidates in a group in the precision model can be
written as a function of the tail probabilities of the group’s candidate distribution.
Lemma 5 (Ganchev et al. [13]). The expected number of discovered candidates in the precision model when
allocating vi units of resource to group i can be written as Eci∼Ci [min (ci, vi)] = Σ
vi
c=1Ti(c).
Proof.
E
ci∼Ci
[min(ci, vi)] =
mi∑
c=1
Prci∼Ci [ci = c] min(c, vi) =
vi−1∑
c=1
Prci∼Ci [ci = c] c+ viTi(vi)
=
vi−2∑
c=1
Prci∼Ci [ci = c] c+ (vi − 1)Ti(vi − 1) + Ti(vi) = Ti(1) + · · ·+ Ti(vi − 1) + Ti(vi)
=
vi∑
c=1
Ti(c).
Note that we can perform the telescoping in the 3rd and 4th lines by observing that Prci∼Ci [ci = c− 1] +
Ti(c) = Ti(c− 1).
We then show that a greedy algorithm would find an optimal allocation in the precision model when the
candidate distributions are known.
Theorem 5 (Theorem 1 in Ganchev et al. [13]). The allocation returned by greedily allocating the next unit
of resource to a group in
arg max
i∈[G]
(Ti(vti + 1)− Ti(vti)) ,
where vti is the current allocation to group i at the t
th round maximizes the expected number of candidates
discovered.
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Proof. Since the tail probability functions Ti(c) are all non-increasing (that is, for c ≤ c′, we have Ti(c′) ≤
Ti(c)), the greedy allocation returns an allocation v which maximizes
χ(v) =
∑
i∈[G]
vi∑
c=1
Ti(c) such that
∑
i∈[G]
vi = V.
Using Lemma 5 we have that ∑
i∈[G]
E
ci∼Ci
[min (ci, vi)] =
∑
i∈[G]
vi∑
c=1
Ti(c).
So the above double-summation is exactly equal to the expected number of discovered candidates. To see
that the greedy solution is optimal, notice that any solution which does not allocate the marginal resource to
the tail with the highest remaining probability can be improved by reallocating the final allocated resource
in some lower tail probability group to the one in the higher tail probability. Finally since each term in
the objective function is non-negative an optimal allocation would use all the V units of resource (so the
feasibility constraint is tight).
B.2 Omitted Details from Section 3.2
Proof of Theorem 1. Fix an optimal α-fair allocation wα. In wα, some group i has the highest fi and
receives allocation wαi . Suppose we know i and w
α
i (we relax this assumption at the end of the proof). Using
the knowledge of Ci we can compute fi(wαi ). This implies that fj ∈ [fi−α, fi] for every other group j, which
in turn can be used to derive the set of all possible allowable allocations wαj which do not violate α-fairness.
We claim that if we initialize the allocation wαj to be the lower bound of the interval corresponding to
group j, then greedily assign the surplus units with the added restriction that wαj is always inside of its
respective interval, we achieve an optimal α-fair allocation.
Since we assume we know wαi to be the allocation to group i in an optimal fair allocation, this allocation
must be achievable by picking some value from each of the intervals, thus initializing the allocation to the
lower bound of each interval certainly cannot assign more than V units in total. By the same argument as for
the unconstrained greedy algorithm, since the objective function is concave (recall that the tail probabilities
are non-increasing) and increasing in each argument wαj , a greedy search over this feasible region finds the
desired allocation.
The algorithm does not know a priori the group i which has the maximum fi or w
α
i , so it must search
over these options. There are G guesses for group i and V + 1 guesses for the allocation to the group. So
there are a total of G(V + 1) guesses that needs to be considered. For each guess, it takes O(M) to compute
the upper and lower bounds on the allocation to each of the groups and O(GV) to run the greedy algorithm.
So the running time of Algorithm 1 is O(GV(GV +M)).
B.3 Omitted Details from Section 3.3
Proof of Theorem 2. Let i denote the group in which A has not allocated at least mi/2 units for at least
k ln(1/δ)/(αmi) rounds upon its termination. We fix an arbitrary allocation v and design two candidate
distributions for group i such that the discovery probabilities given vi computed under the two different
distributions are at least 2α-apart.11 Any algorithm guaranteeing α-fairness must distinguish between these
two distributions with high probability, or v could have higher unfairness than α. We then show that to
distinguish between these two candidate distributions, with probability of at least 1 − α, any algorithm is
required to send mi/2 units to group i for at least k ln(1/δ)/(αmi) rounds.
Consider two candidate distributions Ci and C′i for group i. We use the shorthand pi(c) = Prci∼Ci [ci = c]
and similarly for p′i(c). Let c
∗ = mi/2− 2. We require only that Ci and C′i satisfy the following conditions.
11We assume v sends at least one unit to group i, otherwise it would be easy to construct an example where the algorithm
allocating according to v is unfair.
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1. pi(c) = p
′
i(c) for all c
′ ≤ c∗.
2. Σc≤c∗pi(c) = Σc≤c∗p′i(c) = 1− 2αmi.
3. pi(c
∗ + 1) = 2αmi and pi(c) = 0 for all c ∈ {c∗ + 1, . . . ,mi}.
4. p′i(c) = 0 for all c ∈ {c∗ + 1, . . . ,mi − 1} and p′i(mi) = 2αmi.
In other words, any two distributions that are the same up to c∗, have a CDF value of 2αmi at c∗, and differ
in where in the tail they assign the remaining mass, will serve our purposes.
Let fi(vi) and f
′
i(vi) denote the discovery probability given allocation v which assigns vi units to group
i for candidate distributions Ci and C′i, respectively. Then
|fi(vi)− f ′i(vi)| = 2αmi
∣∣∣∣ vic∗ + 1 − vimi
∣∣∣∣ .
This difference is minimized at vi = 1, in which case∣∣∣∣ vic∗ + 1 − vimi
∣∣∣∣ > 2mi − 1mi = 1mi .
Hence, for any allocation v, |fi(vi)− f ′i(vi)| > 2α.
Finally, because Ci and C′i do not differ on any potential observation less than c∗, distinguishing between
the two candidate distributions requires observing at least one uncensored observation of c∗ or higher. Under
the precision model, this requires sending at least mi/2 units to group i. However, conditioning on sending
at least mi/2 units, the probability of observing an uncensored observation is at most 2αmi. Hence, to
distinguish between Ci and C′i (and thus to guarantee that an allocation v is α-fair) with probability of at
least 1− δ, a learning algorithm must allocate mi/2 units for k ln(1/δ)/(αmi) rounds to group i.
B.4 Omitted Details from Section 3.4
Since in our analysis we consider the groups separately, we fix a group i throughout the rest of this section
and drop the subscript i for convenience. Our first lemma shows that the true underlying parameter λ∗
uniquely maximizes E[`] for any allocation. Since L∗ is just a sum of E[`] terms, it follows as a corollary that
L∗ is uniquely maximized at λ∗ for any sequence of allocations. This is stated as Lemma 6 and Corollary 1.
Lemma 6. For any v, arg maxλ Eo[`(v, o;λ)] = {λ∗}.
Proof. Notice that since the expected log-likelihood function is the average over time periods of individual
`(vti , c
t
i, λ) terms, λ
∗ being the unique maximizer of each term individually will imply that it is the unique
maximizer of the the expected log-likelihood function. Thus we aim to show that
E
[
`
(
vt, ot, λ∗
)]
> E
[
`
(
vt, ot, λ
)]
.
Notice that this is true if and only if
E
[
− log
(
p(vt, ot, λ)
p(vt, ot, λ∗)
)]
> 0. (5)
Recall the Gibb’s inequality, written here for the discrete case as in MacKay [22].
Lemma 7. Suppose p and q are two discrete distributions. Let DKL(p||q) denote the KL divergence between
p and q. Then DKL(p||q) ≥ 0 with equality if and only if p(x) = q(x) for all x.
So the quantity in Equation 5 is the KL divergence between two distributions. Since the distributions
place different probabilities on at least one event (in fact, infinitely many events), the inequality is strict by
Lemma 7.
23
Corollary 1. For any ht, arg maxλ L∗(λ,ht) = {λ∗}.
Lemma 8. |` (vt, ot;λ)| ≤ max (|` (V,V;λmin)| , |` (V − 1,V;λmin)| , |` (1, 0;λmax)|) .
Proof. The Poisson’s PMF is unimodal and achieves its maximum at λ, where p(vt, ot;λ) will be at most 1,
meaning `(vt, ot;λ) ≤ 0. So, in order to bound the absolute value, we will bound how small ` can get.
We prove the claim by a case analysis. For uncensored observations, the minimum log-likelihood is
achieved at either 0 or at V−1 due to unimodality. In this case, the choice of λ that can result in the minimum
value is at λmax or λmin, respectively. In the case of a censored observation, `(v
t, ot;λ) = log(1−F (vt−1;λ)).
So the minimum will be achieved at `(V,V;λmin).
Next we show that for any fixed λ, with high probability over the randomness of {ot}, Lˆ converges to L∗
for any sequence of allocations {vt} that Algorithm 2 could have chosen.
Lemma 9. For any λ ∈ [λmin, λmax] and any ht
Pr
[∣∣∣Lˆ(ht, λ)− L∗(ht, λ)∣∣∣ > ] ≤ 2e− t22C2 ,
where C is a constant and in the case of Poisson distribution
C =
1
2
max
(
|` (V,V;λmin)| , |` (V − 1,V;λmin)| , |` (1, 0;λmax)|
)
.
Proof. With a slight abuse of notation, let A(hs) denote the allocation to the group we are considering. We
define Qt as follows.
Qt := t
(
Lˆ (ht, λ)− L∗ (ht, λ)) = t∑
s=1
` (A(hs), os;λ)−
t∑
s=1
E [` (A(hs), os;λ)] .
So Qt is the sum of the difference between each period’s observed and expected conditional log-likelihood
function. Notice that Qt is a martingale, as E[Qt+1|Qt] = Qt. Moreover, its terms form a bounded difference
sequence since `(A(hs), os;λ) is continuous in osi with osi ∈ [0,V] and λ ∈ [λmin, λmax]. In particular, we
show in Lemma 8 that `(vt, ot;λ)| ≤ 2C.
Since {Qt} is a bounded martingale difference sequence, we can apply Azuma’s inequality to get
Pr
[∣∣Qt −Q0∣∣ ≥ t] ≤ 2e− t22C2 .
Rearranging gives the claim.
For k values of λ, taking the union bound and setting  =
√
2C2 ln(2kG/δ)/t provides the following
corollary.
Corollary 2. Let Λ be a set of k values such that for any λ ∈ Λ, λ ∈ [λmin, λmax]. Then with probability at
least 1− δ/G
max
λ∈Λ
∣∣∣Lˆ(ht, λ)− L∗(ht, λ)∣∣∣ ≤
√
2C2 ln( 2kGδ )
t
,
where C is as in Lemma 9.
Lemma 10. For any λ, λ′ ∈ [λmin, λmax] such that |λ− λ′| < , we have that |`(vt, ot;λ)− `(vt, ot;λ′)| ≤ b
for some constant b.
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Proof. Recall that a differentiable function is Lipschitz-continuous if and only if its derivative is bounded.
By definition,
`
(
vtot;λ
)
:=
{
log
(
e−λλo
t
ot!
)
, ot < vt,
log (1− F (vt − 1;λ)) , otherwise.
So we can analyze the derivative by cases.
In the uncensored case (ot < vt), we have that
`
(
vt, ot, λ
)
= −λ+ ot log λ− log ot! =⇒ ∂`
∂λ
= −1 + o
t
λ
.
For λ ∈ [λmin, λmax] with λmin > 0, this function is continuous and its domain is bounded. Hence its image
is bounded and
In the censored case (ot = vt), we can write that
`
(
vt, ot;λ
)
= log
(
1− F (vt − 1;λ)) = log( ∞∑
k=vt
λke−λ
k!
)
= −λ+ log
( ∞∑
k=vt
λk
k!
)
.
Again taking the derivative, we get
∂`
∂λ
= −1 +
∂
∂λ
∑∞
k=vt
λk
k!∑
k=vt
λk
k!
= −1 +
∂
∂λ
[
eλ −∑vt−1k=0 λkk! ]∑∞
k=vt
λk
k!
= −1 +
λ−∑vt−1k=1 λk−1(k−1)!
λk
k!
.
The fraction is the quotient of two continuous functions and the denominator is nonzero for any λ ∈
[λmin, λmax]. So ∂`/∂λ is continuous in λ. Since the image of a continuous function on a compact set remains
compact, ∂`/∂λ is bounded for all t. Thus `(vt, ot;λ) is Lipschitz-continuous in this case as well.
Proof of Lemma 1. Define the -net as N = {λmin, λmin + , λmin +2, . . . , λmax}. We use k = |N| to denote
the cardinality of the set; so k = dλmax − λmine/. Note that for any λ ∈ [λmin, λmax], there exists λ′ ∈ N
such that |λ− λ′| ≤ .
By Corollary 2, for Λ = {λ1, λ2, . . . , λk}, with probability 1− δ,
max
λ∈Λ
∣∣∣Lˆ (ht, λ)− L∗ (ht, λ)∣∣∣ ≤√2C2
t
ln
(
2kG
δ
)
. (6)
Now, for any λ ∈ [λmin, λmax] by triangle inequality we have that∣∣∣Lˆ (ht, λ)− L∗ (ht, λ)∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣Lˆ (ht, λ)− Lˆ (ht, λ′)∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣Lˆ (ht, λ′)− L∗ (ht, λ′)∣∣∣+ ∣∣L∗ (ht, λ′)− L∗ (ht, λ)∣∣ .
By Lemma 10, the first and third term are at most b where b is again the Lipschitz constant in Lemma 10.
Applying this to the closest λk ∈ N and noting that the inequality in Equation 6 binds on the middle term
with C as in Lemma 9, we have
∣∣∣Lˆ (ht, λ)− L∗ (ht, λ)∣∣∣ ≤ b+
√
2C2 ln
(
2kG
δ
)
t
+ b ≤ 2b+
√
2C2 ln
(
2kG
δ
)
t
≤ 2b+
√√√√2C2 ln( 2Gdλmax−λmineδ )
t
.
Setting  = 1/t yields the claim. Note that as t → ∞, the difference approaches not only constant but
diminishes to 0.
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Lemma 11. Suppose that a continuous function g(x) : [a, b] 7→ R has a unique maximizer x∗. Then for
every  > 0, ∃η > 0 such that g(x∗)− g(x) < η implies |x− x∗| < . In particular, this η can be written as
g(x∗)− max
x∈[a,x∗−]∪[x∗+,b]
g(x).
When g is concave and differentiable, η can be evaluated by evaluating g at a constant number of points.
Proof. Let X be the -radius open ball centered at x
∗, and let Θ be [a, b]\X i.e. the domain of g excluding
the -radius ball centered at the maximizer. Since X is open, Θ is closed and bounded, and therefore
compact. Since g is continuous, the restriction of g to Θ has some maximum g(xˆ) for some (not necessarily
unique) xˆ ∈ Θ.
Observe that, if for any x ∈ [a, b], we have that g(x) > g(xˆ), then x must be in X. Otherwise xˆ would
not be a maximizer of the restriction of f to Θ. Choose η = g(x∗) − g(xˆ). Then, because g(x) > g(xˆ), we
have that g(x∗) − g(x) < g(x∗) − g(xˆ) = η. Therefore, |g(x∗) − g(x)| < η implies |x∗ − x| <  , completing
the proof of existence.
The dependence of η on  is function-dependent, but by construction, η() can be computed by taking
the maximum of g on Θ \ X and subtracting it from g(x∗). Notice that in the case of concavity and
differentiability, this maximization problem is easy to calculate. If g is concave and differentiable over [a, b],
its restrictions to [a, x∗ − ] and [x∗ + , b] are as well. A differentiable, concave function on an interval can
only be maximized at an interior critical point or at one of the two end points. Hence if x∗ is interior, it
must be a critical point, and by concavity it is the unique critical point on [a, b], so g can have no critical
points on Θ \X. Thus g restricted to [a, x∗− ] is maximized at either a or x∗− ; similarly for g restricted
to [x∗ + , b]. On the other hand, if x∗ is either a or b, there is just one interval in Θ \ X to check, and
checking the endpoints of that interval plus exhaust the possible maximizers. In either case, no more than
4 points need be checked; in contrast, without concavity or differentiability, finding the maximum on g on
Θ \X could require more involved optimization techniques.
Corollary 3. For any fixed ht and λ ∈ [λmin, λmax], the following must hold true for L∗(ht, λ) whose unique
maximizer is λ∗. For every , ∃η > 0 such that L∗(ht, λ∗)− L∗(ht, λ) < η implies |λ− λ∗| < , where η is
L∗(ht, λ∗)− max
λ∈[λmin,λ∗−]∪[λ∗+,λmax]
L∗(ht, λ).
Fixing any group, we show that for any fixed allocation v, the difference between the discovery probability
with respect to the true and estimated candidate distributions is proportional to the total variation distance
between the true and estimated distributions.
Lemma 12. Let v be any fixed allocation to the group. Then
∣∣∣f(v, C(λ∗))− f(v, C(λˆ))∣∣∣ ≤ 2DTV (C(λ∗), C(λˆ)).
Proof.∣∣∣f(v, C(λ∗))− f(v, C(λˆ))∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣∣ Ec∼C(λ∗)
[
min(v, c)
c
]
− E
c∼C(λˆ)
[
min(v, c)
c
]∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
c=0
min(v, c)
c
(
Pr[c;λ∗]− Pr[c; λˆ]
)∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∞∑
c=0
min(v, c)
c
∣∣∣Pr[c;λ∗]− Pr[c; λˆ]∣∣∣ ≤ ∞∑
c=0
∣∣∣Pr[c;λ∗]− Pr[c; λˆ]∣∣∣
≤ 2DTV (C(λ∗), C(λˆ)).
C Omitted Details from Section 4
Table 1 represents the average and standard deviation of the number of daily reported incidents in all of the
districts in the Philadelphia Crime Incidents dataset.
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id average standard deviation
1 11.35 5.1
2 27.44 9.24
3 20.37 9.27
5 7.36 3.65
6 22.67 7.54
7 10.47 4.56
8 17.26 6.77
9 19.83 7.15
12 30.97 10.86
14 28.69 9
15 43.5 12.69
16 17.36 6.99
17 17.41 7.45
18 25.88 8.35
19 33.43 10.71
22 30.45 9.89
24 38.47 11.82
25 35.54 12.41
26 20.55 7.16
35 30.92 9.79
39 23.24 7.16
Table 1: The average and standard deviation in the ground truth distributions in each of the districts of the
Philadelphia Crime Incidents dataset.
Table 2 displays the `1 and `∞ distances of the ground truth and best Poisson fit distribution for all of
the districts in the Philadelphia Crime Incidents dataset. Observe that the `∞ metric shows that the Poisson
fit provides a close approximation for the ground truth distribution. Also as Figure 1 displays, the Poisson
fit is a better approximation to the ground truth had we ignored the 0 counts (the frequency of the days
in which no crime has been reported) in the dataset. This metric has also been measured in Table 2 in the
“no zero” columns. Note that the goodness of fit would improve significantly when removing the 0 counts
according to the `1 measure but would not change at all according to the `∞ measure.
In Figure 5 we compare the Pareto frontiers for the optimal and fitted curves. Figure 5 shows that the
performance (in terms of the utility/fairness trade-off) does not degrade significantly when we assume the
Philadelphia Crime Incidents dataset is generated according to Poisson distributions.
D Omitted Details From Section 5
First, we write down the integer programming to compute an optimal α-fair allocation in the random model
described in Section 5.2.
max
v={v1,...,vG}
G∑
i=1
vi E[ci]
mi
,
subject to
∣∣∣∣ vimi − vjmj
∣∣∣∣ ≤ α,∀i and j,
G∑
i=1
vi ≤ V,
vi ∈ N,∀i.
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id `1 `1 (no zero) `∞ `∞ (no zero)
1 0.1656 0.1562 0.0315 0.0315
2 0.2021 0.1928 0.0293 0.0293
3 0.3420 0.3327 0.0493 0.0493
5 0.1203 0.1093 0.0328 0.0328
6 0.1853 0.1760 0.0309 0.0309
7 0.1269 0.1175 0.0279 0.0279
8 0.1835 0.1742 0.0365 0.0365
9 0.2025 0.1931 0.0315 0.0315
12 0.2600 0.2507 0.0304 0.0304
14 0.2024 0.1931 0.0239 0.0239
15 0.2305 0.2212 0.0276 0.0276
16 0.2024 0.1931 0.0354 0.0354
17 0.2495 0.2402 0.0436 0.0436
18 0.1953 0.1860 0.0278 0.0278
19 0.2494 0.2401 0.0337 0.0337
22 0.2469 0.2375 0.0326 0.0326
24 0.2529 0.2436 0.0284 0.0284
25 0.2844 0.2751 0.0312 0.0312
26 0.1896 0.1803 0.0328 0.0328
35 0.2187 0.2095 0.0291 0.0291
39 0.1478 0.1385 0.0243 0.0243
average 0.2123 0.2029 0.0319 0.0319
Table 2: Various statistical distances between the ground truth distribution and best Poisson fit for each of
the districts.
Figure 5: Pareto frontier of the expected crimes discovered versus fairness violation.
Next we present the proof of Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 4. Observe that when V/m1 ≤ α the allocation that sends all of the units of the resource
to group 1 is both optimal and α-fair. For the case that V/m1 > α, we will first provide an upper bound on
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the PoF by providing some allocation v, which is is α-fair, and use that to show fairness does not deteriorate
the total number of candidates discovered by v compared to an optimal α-fair allocation. And then, we will
construct a specific candidate distributions C′ and compute the PoF to show that the upper bound is tight.
Consider the following allocation v.
vi =
{(V+α(M−m1)
M
)
m1, i = 1,(V−αm1
M
)
mi, otherwise.
(7)
We show that v is a feasible α-fair allocation. To show feasibility, observe that∑
i∈[G]
vi =
V − αm1
M
∑
i∈[G]
mi + αm1 = V.
To show that v is α-fair observe that
|f1(v1)− fi(vi)| =
∣∣∣∣ v1m1 − vimi
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣V + α(M −m1)M − V − αm1M
∣∣∣∣ = α and |fi(vi)− fj(vj)| = 0,∀i, j 6= 1.
Since v is a feasible α-fair allocation, for any C, we have that
χ(wα, C) ≥ χ(v, C) ≥ µ1v1,
where the last inequality is derived by counting only the candidates that allocation v discovers in group
1 according to the random model and ignoring all the discoveries in other groups. Moreover, for any C,
χ(w∗, C) = µ1V by the argument in Section 5.1. Therefore,
PoF = max
C
χ(w∗, C)
χ(wα, C) ≤
µ1V
µ1v1
=
VM
m1 (V + α(M −m1)) ≤
M
m1 + α(M −m1) ,
where the last inequality uses the assumption that V ≤ m1.
To derive the lower bound on the PoF, we construct a candidate distribution C′ and compute the PoF.
We show that our lower on PoF matches the upper bound, so our analysis on PoF is tight.
To construct C′ assume all groups have size V i.e. mi = V for all i. Furthermore, assume group 1 has V
candidates and the rest of the groups have 0 candidates deterministically. Then the optimal allocation w∗
is to send all the V units of resource to group 1, and doing so will discover V candidates (since µ1 = 1). As
for the optimal α-fair allocation, we show that wα = v where v is the same allocation as the allocation used
in our upper bound (see Equation 7).
Lemma 13. For C′, wα = v where v is defined in Equation 7.
Proof. For C′, because all groups have the same size, vi = vj for all i, j 6= 1. Since Σi∈[G]vi = V, vi =
(V − v1)/(G − 1) for all i 6= 1. Now, any feasible α-fair allocation v′ must have v′1 ≤ v1. Assume by the way
of contradiction that v′1 > v1. Then, after assigning v
′
1 units of resource to group 1, the remaining units that
will be strictly less than V − v1 will be distributed among the remaining G − 1 groups. By the pigeonhole
principle, there must exist at least one group j such that
v′j <
V − v1
G − 1 = vj =
(V − αm1
M
)
mj .
Now observe that ∣∣f1(v′1)− fj(v′j)∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣ v′1m1 − v
′
j
mj
∣∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∣V + α(M −m1)M − V − αm1M
∣∣∣∣ = α.
So v′ cannot be α-fair. Therefore, v must be an optimal α-fair allocation since in v the maximum number
of units of resources are allocated to group 1 which is the only group that contains candidates.
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Note that the number of candidates discovered by wα is exactly v1 since µ1 = 1. So given the w
α for C′
we can compute the PoF as follows.
PoF =
χ(w∗, C′)
χ(wα, C′) =
V
v1
=
VM
(V + α(M −m1))m1 =
m1M
(m1 + α(M −m1))m1 =
M
m1 + α(M −m1) .
This lower bounds matches our upper bound so our analysis on PoF is tight.
D.1 Relaxing the Assumption of V ≤ mi.
In this section we relax the assumption that V ≤ mi for all groups i. We first show how an optimal allocation
can be computed using a greedy algorithm. Recall that we have assumed µ1 ≥ µ2 ≥ . . . ≥ µG . Optimal
algorithm allocates v1 = min(V,m1) units of resource to group 1. And recurse with the remaining V − v1
resources on the rest of the groups. If this algorithm allocates resources to groups 1 through k then the
expected utility of the algorithm can be written as
k−1∑
i=1
µimi + µkvk =
k−1∑
i=1
µimi + µk(V −
k−1∑
i=1
mi).
In the case that V ≤ mi, the algorithm allocates all the resources to group 1 without any leftover resources
for other groups.
We note that an optimal α-fair allocation can still be computed with the same integer program. Fur-
thermore, the lower bound on the PoF as computed in Theorem 4 continues to hold even when we relax the
assumption.
However, our upper bound analysis on the PoF breaks when we relax the assumption. While it is possible
to derive a similar upper bound by careful analysis, we do not investigate this direction as the lower bound
on PoF shows that the PoF in the random model can still be quite high even without the assumption made
in Section 3.
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